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INTRODUCTION
We suffer in the law from a failure of imagination. We assume
that if we do not ban insider trading, insiders everywhere will trade.
We assume that if we do not force firms to disclose their financials,
no one will. We assume that if we do not mandate strict products
liability, consumers will rarely recover against firms with dangerous
products.
Our blindness is the public's loss. In fact, if we allowed insider
trading, we have every reason to think that some (perhaps many)
firms would ban it anyway to attract investors who preferred firms
without the practice.' Before 1933, we did not require financial
disclosure, but many firms disclosed their financials to court
investors who valued the information.2 And before 1995, Japan did
not mandate strict products liability, but many Japanese firms
voluntarily subjected themselves to the rule to attract buyers who
wanted the protection such a rule gave.
In this short Article, I outline the voluntary products liability
regime in Japan: strict liability by private ordering. I begin in Part
I by summarizing the dubious case for mandatory strict products
liability. I explain in Part II how the privately ordered Japanese
system worked and in Part III discuss the resulting claim levels.
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I. MANDATORY STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Modern products liability law may be well-established, but it is
notoriously hard to justify.' Essentially, it imposes on consumer
sales contracts a broad panoply of nonwaivable terms. It forces
sellers (or manufacturers) in specified consumer sales contracts to
agree to compensate buyers (and specified third parties) for
specified damages caused by specified defects in specified products.
Restated, it forces sellers to bundle insurance contracts with the
goods they sell.4
Basic theory, however, suggests that if some buyers want
bundled insurance contracts, then in unregulated markets some
sellers will offer them. When customized sales contracts are
feasible, sellers will offer insurance contracts tailored to specific
buyers. And when customized contracts are infeasible, market
competition will still drive some sellers to bundle some insurance
contracts with some products. Consumers who want the products-
liability protection will buy the bundled insurance-product package.
The rest will buy the unbundled product.
As a result, a legal regime that forces sellers to bundle products-
liability coverage with the product sold almost necessarily lowers
consumer welfare.5 Granted, consumers who want the insurance-
It may not be quite so well-established as many of us have thought (for example,
there is considerable localjudicial variation and statutory intervention). See generally
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (demon-
strating that in products liability law, changes in judicial decisionmaking are occurring
and that current trends favor defendants).
" A point made more elegantly by several others. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon,
Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13J. LEGAL STUD.
517, 517 (1984) (noting that "the tort system may be viewed as a system of
compulsory insurance, with terms of coverage determined largely by the private
choices that generate court decisions" (footnote omitted)); Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability As an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 646 (1985)
(examining "the extent to which the want of privity between manufacturer and
consumer makes it necessary for the law to construct its general liability rules to take
into account the standard insurance risks that voluntary markets seek to overcome");
George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended, 9 YALEJ. REG. 237,
242 (1992) (asserting that manufacturer liability "can be regarded as providing a form
of insurance to consumers for product-related losses through a third-party insurance
mechanism").
'Many observers forcefully make this point. See, e.g., PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT
REFORM BY CONTRACT 4-5 (1993) (noting that consumers prefer not to insure against
nonpecuniary loss such as loss of life); W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 77 (1991) (noting that in many situations "the amount that would have to
be added to the price," to insure the product, "would greatly exceed the value of the
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product bundle will still obtain it in the now-regulated market.
Those who do not want it, however, will need either (1) to buy
insurance worth less to them than the price they must now pay or
(2) to do without the product, given the higher bundled price.
Again, it is no answer to say that consumers will generally want the
insurance. If consumers value it more than it costs, sellers in
unregulated markets will still offer it.
Because of this straightforward case against strict products
liability, scholars inclined to justify it turn to a series of questionable
empirical claims: that given the informational and computational
difficulties in determining the risk levels of complex products,
consumers wildly miscalculate accident costs; that given cognitive
dissonance, consumers systematically underestimate health risks;
that given the small value associated with insurance coverage in any
one contract, manufacturers will not find the coverage cost-effective;
that given the difficulties in distinguishing high- and low-risk
consumers, adverse selection will preclude a private insurance
market; or that given the need to deny the risks in their own
products, firms will rarely convey realistic information even about
the risks of their competitors' products.6
To illustrate some of these arguments, take an entirely hypothet-
ical discussion of disposable cigarette lighters. Suppose, on average,
that three in every ten million lighters explode and cause bodily
injury of about $150,000 per individual. Even if rational consumers
would want to protect themselves against such an injury, argue
insurance to current consumers of the product"); John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin,
Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniay Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371,
372 (1992) ("Damage payments that transfer wealth from situations in which there is
no accident to situations in which there is will therefore tend to reduce total utility,
and informed consumers would not want to pay the actuarially fair price for such
transfers (which amount to involuntary insurance)."); Richard A. Epstein, The
Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193,2214 (1989)
(arguing that products liability laws preclude bargains that would work to consumers'
advantages); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1524 (1987) (attributing the current insurance crisis to modern tort
law's expansion of liability); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 820 (1992) (arguing for a market default for risk allocation
because free contracting increases consumer payoff); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,355 (1988) (arguing
that the law should reflect consumers' risk-allocation preferences).
6 For a representative example of such claims, see 1 AMERICAN LAW INST.,
REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILIrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 203-32 (1991).
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many observers, they could not correctly calculate the cost given the
minuscule odds and the gruesome injuries.
Moreover, these proponents continue, a firm would earn only
a trivial competitive advantage by bundling insurance with its
products. After all, the cost of the risk itself is only $150,000 x
0.0000003 = $0.045 per lighter. No firm will undertake the
managerial costs necessary to design a bundled contract when the
returns are so small. And since no firm will want to call attention
to the risks associated with its own products, no firm will be able to
advertise cost-effectively any liability insurance it did bundle.
Hence the conclusion: even though consumers prefer insurance
against defective lighters, the vagaries of consumer irrationality and
imperfect competition will inevitably create a world without it.
Accordingly, the law can improve the lot of both sellers and buyers
by forcing sellers to bundle insurance. Strict products liability law
does just that, by holding sellers or manufacturers liable for
personal injuries caused by defective products. As William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner put it in one of the most sophisti-
cated and articulate justifications for products liability law:
[W]e take up the fundamental economic puzzle of products
liability law: the injurer and the victim have a contractual
relationship, so why shouldn't they be left to work out the optimal
combination of safety precautions contractually? Why isn't no
liability optimal?
The answer is that contracts are costly to make and that the
costs may well exceed the benefits, relative to regulation by tort
law, when the contingencies that would be regulated by contract-
death or personal injury from using a product-are extremely
remote. It hardly pays, when buying a case of beer, to enter into
a contract specifying rights and duties in the event that one of the
bottles of beer explodes in your face.
7
Yet, is the empirical premise right? If pop or beer bottles
occasionally exploded in consumers' faces, would bottlers really find
that contracting for liability did not pay 8 Consider tentative
evidence from Japan.
7 WILIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 280 (1987) (citations omitted).
s Scholars skeptical of the example on theoretical grounds include Patricia M.
Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Lia-
bility, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 572 (1985) (arguing that the Landes-Posner logic does
not apply in the case of repeat-purchase consumer products), and Epstein,supra note
5, at 2204 (stating that Landes and Posner overemphasize imperfect information).
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II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN JAPAN
A. Basic Products Liability
Until 1995, Japanese consumers bought products in a world
governed by a general negligence regime.9 To sue on an accident
involving a product, plaintiffs had to prove notjust that the product
had been defective but also that its manufacturer had been
negligent. EffectiveJuly 1, 1995, theJapanese government changed
the rule." With enormous hullabaloo, it substituted for negligence
a strict liability standard for defective products. In fact, the change
may have been less significant than the hullabaloo would suggest.
In some spheres, Japanese courts had imposed standards close to
strict liability already," and the concept of "defect" in the new law
will probably still incorporate a cost-benefit approach resembling
the classic Hand formula.
12
Why the Diet enacted the change is unclear. Some of the
pressure for the change came from scholars, journalists, and
politicians arguing that consumers had been "exploited" by profit-
hungry businesses." Some of the pressure came from "public
interest" lobbyists determined to maximize their own appeal. Some
came from foreign firms claiming that Japanese firms gained an
"unfair" advantage by selling in a home market without strict
products liability. 4 Elementary public choice analysis suggests that
9 See MINPO § 709.
o See Seiz6butsu Sekinin H6 [Products Liability Act], Law No. 85 of 1994. For a
"tentative" official translation, see SEIZ6BUTSU SEKININ Ho NO KAISETSU [EXPLA-
NATION OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT] 184-88 (Tsiish6 Sangy6 Sh6 ed., 1994)
[hereinafter 1994 MITI EXPLANATION].
" SeeJudgment of Feb. 14,1986 (K.K. Tokiwa Sh6ji v. Yamamoto), Chisai [District
Court], 1196 HANJI 32 (Japan) (involving an action against a toy bow-and-arrow maker
by a child blinded in an accident); Judgment of Dec. 19, 1978 (Kigura v. Kasaoka),
Chisai [District Court], 928 HANJi 87 (Japan) (involving an action against a restaurant
by heirs of a kabuki grand master killed by eating blowfish liver).
12 See 1994 MITI EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 76 (official commentary). See
generally Mark Geistfeld, Manufacturer Moral Hazard and the Tort-Contract Issue in
Products Liability, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 241, 255 n.23 (1995) (noting the
difference between strict liability and strict products liability); Gary T. Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435 (1979) (discussing the
development of the requirement of "defect" in products liability law).
" For position papers by various political parties and other groups, see the
materials collected in 1994 MITI EXPLANATION, supra note 10.
14 See id. at 16; MANABU HAYASHIDA, PL HO SHINJIDAI [NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACT AcE] 56-59 (1995); CHIKuJO KAIsETsu SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ Ho [ANNOTATED
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT] 41-50 (Keizai Kikaku Ch6 ed., 1994) [hereinafter 1994 EPA
ANNOTATION].
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some of the pressure must have come from firms with a cost
advantage in safety who could now use products liability law to gain
a competitive advantage over their rivals. Whatever the reason-
interesting as the issue is, it lies beyond the scope of this short
Article-the Diet imposed strict products liability.
B. The SG System
Unbeknownst to most Western observers for nearly two decades,
many Japanese firms had already subjected themselves-voluntarily-
to a strict products liability regime. In 1973, the Diet enacted the
Consumer Products Safety Act and through it established the
Product Safety Council." The Act itself explicitly authorized only
a small mandatory regime. It authorized the Council to establish
safety standards for a few hazardous categories of products and to
ban those products that did not meet the standards. Within a short
time, the Council had designated eight categories of such products:
motorcycle helmets, baby beds, pressure cookers, baseball helmets,
roller skates, mountain climbing ropes, carbonated soft-drink
bottles, and bottle caps. Under the system, if a product met the
safety standards, the Council let it use the "S" (for Safety) label. If
the product failed to meet the standards, the Council forced it off
the market."
Simultaneously, though, the Council began coordinating a
separate, privately ordered products liability regime. Although the
government had organized the Council, this second system was
almost entirely extralegal. The 1973 Consumer Products Safety Act
did not mandate it, and private firms did not need a statute to
organize it. As noted below, firms in some industries have since
organized similar systems completely independent of the Council. 7
This voluntary regime had four components: safety standards,
testing, insurance, and a distinctive legal rule. Consider initially the
first three components. First, the Council set safety standards for
a variety of products. By 1994, it had established standards for 103
is See Sh6hi Seikatsu Y6 Seihin Anzen H6 [Consumer Products Safety Act], Law
No. 31 of 1973.
16 See SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ TO BAISH6 RIKO KAKUHO [PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE
ASSURANCE OF COMPENSATION] 54 (Keizai Kikakuch6 ed., 1988) [hereinafter 1988
EPA REPORT].
"7 Hypothetically, the firms might have designed the system to forestall a
mandatory products liability regime. There is, however, no evidence of that.
If the government played an important role in starting the voluntary products
liability regime, that role was at most one of overcoming coordination problems.
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products, ranging from baby buggies, bunk beds, disposable
lighters, and bicycles to pop bottles. Table 1 lists the most
commonly certified products."
Second, the Council tested products submitted to it by manufac-
turers. If a product met the safety standards the Council had just
set, the firm could attach an "SG" (for Safety Goods) label. If the
product failed the test, the firm simply sold it without the label.
The firms involved paid the costs of these tests.
Firms had a choice of two types of tests. Most simply, they
could submit a batch of the products to the Council. The Council
would then test the batch, and if it passed, the firm could apply the
SG mark to all items in that particular batch. More practically for
mass-produced goods, the firm could ask the Council to inspect
their product design and manufacturing processes. If a firm passed
the test, it could apply the label to all of the items it produced using
that design and process.
Within Japan, the Council retained several specialized test-
ing organizations (for example, the Japan Electrical Appliance
Testing Institute). At the outset, importers could use only the
batch-testing process. By the mid-1980s, however, the Council
had established testing arrangements with foreign testing organiza-
tions (for example, the Underwriters Laboratories). Foreign firms
could have their designs and manufacturing processes certified as
well.19
Third, the Council insured those products for which it autho-
rized the SG seal through a private carrier. It charged premiums
that averaged about 0.5% of a product's retail price.20  As the
mandatory S-label system provided no insurance, S producers who
wanted to offer products liability coverage could also certify their
products under the SG system. Many did, as the prominence of
motorcycle helmets, pop bottles, pressure cookers, and roller skates
on Table 1 attests.
18 See PL TAISAKU HANDOBUKKU [PRODUCTS LIABILlTY Poucy HANDBOOK] 71
(Tsfish6 Sangy5 Sh6 ed., 1994).
19 
See SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ SEIDO WO CHOSHIN TO SHITA SOGOTEKI NA SHOHISHA
HIGAI B6SHI KYOZAI NO ARIKATA NI TSUTE [REGARDING THE PROPER COMPREHENSIVE
MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF AND COMPENSATION FOR CONSUMER HARMS,
CENTERED AROUND A PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYSTEM] 201-02 (Keizai Kikakuch6 ed.,
1993) [hereinafter 1993 EPA REPORT].
I See 1988 EPA REPORT, supra note 16, at 56.
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TABLE 1: Most Commonly Labeled SG Items 1
Item
Disposable cigarette lighters
Cotton swabs
Carbonated soft-drink bottles
Adhesive hooks
Motorcycle helmets
Automobile jacks
Oil filters
Can openers
Windshield washer fluid
Bathtub lids
Aluminum pans
Metal stepladders
Metal baseball bats
Pressure cookers
Roller skates
Baby buggies
Hot water bottles
Baby carriers
Note: The table gives a simple count of the number of items sold with the SG label
as of August 1992.
Under the SG insurance, the Product Safety Council paid
specified amounts to users injured by defective SG goods. Those
firms that wanted to bundle a products-liability insurance contract
with their goods could thus submit the products to the Council and
pay a fee. The Council would test the products and, if they met its
safety standards, would compensate users injured by them. Those
firms that did not want to bundle products-liability insurance with
21 See HAYASHIDA, supra note 14, at 136-39.
Amount sold
(million)
5882.2
2251.8
1285.2
201.9
47.4
45.2
42.6
40.7
24.8
24.6
24.2
17.3
15.5
13.9
13.4
12.5
12.1
10.5
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their products could sell their wares independently. The rate of
coverage varied by industry.
C. A Private Legal Regime
In effect, firms used the SG system to raise the legal standard by
which they would be bound. Voluntarily, they replaced the
negligence requirement in tort with a rule that allowed a user to
recover if he or she could show three things: (1) that the product
had been defective, (2) that he or she had been injured, and (3) that
the defect had caused the injuries.22 For that process, the firms
hired the Council to serve as judge, jury, and insurer.
Unfortunately, I lack the details on some of the program's more
intriguing aspects. The Council apparently did not publish
regulations or records of its decisions. We, thus, have only the
rough outlines and second-hand accounts of some of its practices.
Caveats about the lack of good data on some matters aside, the
Council seemed to follow what for anyone but a lawyer would seem
to be a straightforward approach: if a product broke in the course
of normal use, the Council would pay damages; if it performed as
a consumer should expect it to perform, or if a consumer ignored
ordinary precautions, the Council would not. For example, if a little
girl broke her leg because the wheels fell off her roller skates in
normal use, the Council presumably would pay. If she broke her leg
because it was her first time skating and she tried to skate down too
steep a hill, the Council presumably did not. Consumers found the
lack of detail acceptable because of the Council's-and the manu-
facturers'--interest in preserving future business.
By design, SG justice was cheap. The Council dispensed with
much of the detailed proof courts demanded, and victims, there-
fore, could recover with less evidence either of a product's defect
or of causation. From time to time, observers complained about the
SG system, but usually they complained only that more products
should be covered by the system.23 They rarely complained that
the Council interpreted concepts like causation or defect too restric-
tively.
2 See id. at 133.
23 See 1994 MITI EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at supp. 29, 38; 1994 EPA
ANNOTATION, supra note 14, at 275; 1993 EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 91.
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TABLE 2: Litigated Products Liability Cases As of March 1994
(Published Opinions Only)
24
Item Suits Plaintiff Mean years
filed victories to judgment
Pharmaceuticals 19 17 6.0
Food products 14 11 5.3
Household machinery 10 5 4.6
Automobiles 17 6 4.4
Industrial machinery 20 13 4.8
Gas stoves 21 16 4.2
Chemicals 9 5 6.4
Real estate 22 20 6.2
Other 5 1 3.6
SG justice was also fast. The Council paid claims quickly.
Sometimes, it even paid within a month.2 5 Indeed, if a claimant
could show serious personal injury, unless he or she was clearly and
exclusively responsible for the injury, the Council immediately paid
Y600,000 as interim aid.26 Even if the claimant later failed to
prove his or her claim, he or she could still keep the Y600,000. By
contrast, as Table 2 shows, a claimant who sued in court commonly
waited five years.
2 7
24 See 1994 MITI EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at supp. 248-51.
2 See 1993 EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 13. Claimants under the BL-Better
Living, as discussed below-system can apparently expect to resolve their dispute
within three months at the new BL dispute resolution center. The BL administrative
mechanism has apparently been perceived as less impartial than the Consumer
Product Safety Council. See HAYASHIDA, supra note 14, at 181-83.
As of March 1996, $1 = Y106.2; thus, Y600,000 = $5649.72.
Three obvious but crucial caveats apply. First, one would expect litigated cases
to differ from cases in the SG system in a variety of important ways. Table 2 does not
imply that claimants who in fact proceeded through the SG system would also have
waited five years if they had proceeded through the courts instead. Second, Table 2
deals only with cases that resulted in published opinions, but published opinions
appear in only a small subset of all suits filed. Third, the proportion of plaintiff
victories among suits filed (Column 2/Column 1) tells us nothing about the extent
to which a legal rule favors the plaintiff-for reasons detailed in George L. Priest &
Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984)
(discussing the impossibility of reaching conclusions about legal bias based on verdict
rates).
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TABLE 3: Calculated Decedent Lost Earnings,
by Age and Sex (Y million)"
Age Male Female
10 33 18
20 48 27
30 45 25
40 39 22
50 30 17
60 21 11
Note: Calculated using standard judicial principles: (1) an age of 67 at expected
retirement date, (2) mean wages, and (3) a 50% deduction for living expenses. The
relatively simple (indeed, simplistic) computation method is standard to the Tokyo
District Court as used in traffic accident cases.
The Council capped its liability for personal injury at Y30
million and paid no compensation for property damages. The
amount is low, but not egregiously so. It is the minimum coverage
that automobile drivers must carry,29 and it lets most women and
some men (particularly if they were comparatively negligent-Japan
has a comparative negligence regime) collect the bulk of the
amounts they could collect in court. In this regard, consider
Table 3: estimates of the mean value of lost earnings awards that
courts award in wrongful-death actions under the Tokyo District
Court's formula for traffic accident cases. Note that courts
generally add awards for pain and suffering as well: about Y24
million for breadwinners and Y17 to 21 million for dependents or
unmarried persons.
30
In effect, the system coupled (1) broader coverage and cheaper
claim procedures with (2) caps on damage awards. Two analogies
come to mind. First, the system closely resembles the voluntary
nineteenth-century workers' compensation systems: there too, the
parties privately negotiated arrangements that combined broader
2' For computation methods, see KANDA, supra note 29, at 169.
29 See YOJI KANDA, K6Ts JIKO NO SONcAI BAiSH6 GAKU [DAMAGE AMOUNTS IN
TRAFFIC AccIDENTs] 289 (1994).
30 See id. at 185. The new Products Liability Act is subject, like Japanese tort law
generally, to offsets for a plaintiff's own negligence. See 1994 EPA ANNOTATION,
supra note 14, at 127.
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TABLE 4: Claims and Payouts Under the SG System
(Through 19 9 1)sI
A B C D E
Categories Items Complaints Complaints Compensation
Labeled Labeled Filed Recognized Paid
(10 million) (Y1000)
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1.8
7.7
10.6
12.7
27.3
50.6
47.8
56.3
60.4
64.0
74.9
83.7
63.1
74.8
77.7
83.5
89.4
96.7
8
525
374
2186
11,953
5051
15,653
32,142
3039
9317
27,644
4481
1028
2761
19,041
6245
12,725
1794
Total labeled goods sold:
Total complaints lodged:
Total meritorious complaints:
Total compensation paid:
Mean compensation paid:
9,829 million
727
339
Y156 million
Y460 thousand
Notes: The columns represent (A) the categories of products subject to SG labeling,
(B) the number of items sold with the SG label, (C) the number of complaints filed
with the Product Safety Council with respect to items sold with SG labels, (D) the
number of complaints (C) which were judged to be meritorious, and (E) the total
compensation paid.
1 See 1993 EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 205.
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coverage formulae with damage caps.3 2  Second, the system
resembles many voluntary product warranties in the United States.
Again, the warranties ease the process of proving claims, but in a
variety of ways simultaneously limit the amounts recoverable.3 3
Given its obvious appeal, the intriguing question may not be why
Japanese manufacturers offered the SG system, as much as why
American manufacturers do not-that is, why American warranties
so often exclude personal injury claims. The answer probably lies
(although the argument is speculative) in the hostility most
American courts show toward disclaimers and liability caps. The SG
firms could profitably offer the broader coverage in part because
they could simultaneously limit awards. American firms can expand
coverage, but cannot assume that courts will enforce any limits on
awards they make pursuant to that broader coverage. 4 Given the
anticipated judicial hostility to damage caps, American firms cannot
profitably broaden coverage.
Table 4 details claims and recoveries under the SG system.
From 1974 to 1991, victims asserted 727 claims. The Council
recognized 339 complaints and paid aggregate compensation of
about Y156 million, or Y460,000 per claim.
Table 5 details the products that gave rise to these claims. The
most commonly recognized complaints involved disposable cigarette
lighters. Others included baby buggies, swing sets, and step ladders.
Within a few years of the establishment of the SG system, firms
in several industries outside the SG regime began similar but
independent systems of their own. For instance, in 1974 the makers
of large household items (for example, kitchen cabinets and
integrated bathroom units) introduced the BL (Better Living) label.
As of 1992, their system covered thirty-five products and paid up to
Y50 million per person and Y500 million per accident.3 5 Toy-
makers now use the ST (Safety Toy) label and pay up to Y10 million
12 See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of
Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800-03 (1982) (describing the general
structure of workers' compensation plans).
-" See generally George L. Priest, A Theomy of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L.J. 1297, 1301-02 (1981) (noting that warranties often place limitations on
remedies).
' See, e.g., Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 18 (N.J. 1974) (enforcing
expanded warranty coverage but striking down damage limits pursuant to that
coverage).
I The actual maximum amount depended on the product involved.
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TABLE 5: SG Claims Paid As ofJune 1987'
Item
Disposable cigarette lighters
Baby buggies
Swings
Metal stepladders
Pressure cookers
Bicycles
Roller skates
Baby beds
Slides
Bunk beds
Expanders
Walkers
Baby carriers
Motorcycle helmets
Tricycles
High chairs
Ovens
Ice shavers
Ladders
Others
per victim for injuries from defective toys. The label covers about
ninety percent of all toys sold. Fireworks manufacturers and
importers began an SF (Safety Fireworks) label system in 1977 and
pay up to Y100 million per accident. The fireworks trade associa-
tion has apparently used its clout to make coverage universal.3 7
36 1988 EPA REPORT, supra note 16, at 63.
37 See 1993 EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 13-14, 208; HAYASHIDA, supra note 14,
at 134; HAYAWAKARI-PL NO SUBETE [EASY TO UNDERSTAND: ALL ABOUT PRODUCTs
LIABILITY] 111 (Toshitsugu Matsumoto ed., 1992).
Number of claims paid
49
36
27
26
16
12
9
9
8
7
6
5
5
5
4
3
2
2
2
8
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III. SG CLAIM LEVELS
There is a puzzle here. In nearly two decades, the Council has
granted only 339 claims. As Table 4 shows, however, the harder
puzzle is not the number of claims paid; it is the number of claims
filed. In nearly two decades, only 727 parties have asserted any
claims. By contrast, in the United States (with roughly twice the
population of Japan), claimants file 14,000 products liability claims
per year in the federal courts alone.3 8
Initially, three points seem relevant to this puzzle. First, the
reason for the low claiming levels does not seem to lie with any
dramatically restrictive policies at the Products Safety Council.
True, if most potential claimants knew the Council demanded high
levels of proof, then fewer people would file claims. Because only
victims with the strongest claims would file, the forty-five percent
success rate (339/727) would disguise how restrictive the Council
has been. As noted earlier, however, in all of the controversy over
the new Products Liability Act, few observers of any political stripe
have claimed that the Council has been too restrictive.
39
Second, a few big tort disputes skew the American products
liability data. Perhaps half of the recent cases have been asbestos
cases.4" The Dalcon Shield and benedectin disputes stack the
numbers higher still.4
Third, the right benchmark by which to measure claiming levels
is the number of victims, and for that purpose the 14,000 federal
suits are notoriously misleading. Put somewhat polemically, the
right benchmark is not how many people can plausibly file claims;
it is not how many can convince juries that a manufacturer ought to
pay their medical bills; it is not even how many people suffer
product-related injuries. The right benchmark is how many people
are injured each year by defective products (granted, the phrase hides
a thousand sins), and there are precious few reasons to think that
the American data track that benchmark much at all. 2
8 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 147, 151 (1991) (calculating that claimants filed 14,145 personal injury products
liability cases in the federal courts in 1987).
" See supra text accompanying note 23.
40 See Viscusi, supra note 38, at 154-57 (discussing asbestos litigation and
explaining that 55% of all products liability cases in 1987 were asbestos related).
41 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LIGATION
EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED 23 (1988).
42 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 225-45
(1995) (explaining the characteristics of the contemporary products liability scene).
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Instead of arguing before six novices culled from department of
motor vehicle records, suppose American trial lawyers had to make
their cases to engineers from the Underwriters Lab. That, after all,
is pretty much what happens in the SG system. Probably, most
observers would conclude that plaintiffs would file dramatically
fewer claims. Probably, many would also conclude that outcomes
would be more accurate. Perhaps-not to put too fine a point on
it-claiming levels are high in the United States because juries
sympathize with accident victims and are easy to fool. They are low
under the SG system because the fact-finders know what they are
doing.
Even given all this, the most important reasons that theJapanese
SG claim figures fall far below the American products liability
figures lie elsewhere: the reasons lie in the facts that the SG system
(1) covers only a small segment of the Japanese economy and (2)
disproportionately covers the safer products at that. After all, a total
count of Japanese products liability claims would not just include
SG claims; it would include the large number of claims against
products not covered by the system. And there are many such
claims. Firms in the health-care and recreational-products indus-
tries, for example, report over 200 claims a year.43 The Japan
Federation of Bar Associations' Product Liability Hotline handles
over 1000 calls annually." The Citizen Life Center-an organiza-
tion heavily concerned with consumer affairs-handles nearly 1200
product-safety complaints a year.45 And in 1993 alone, the restau-
rant industry paid Y22 million to over 8000 patrons.
46
Necessarily, moreover, the SG system will disproportionately
cover the safest products. To see why, ask whyJapanese consumers
would want to pay for SG certification. They hardly want the
insurance for its own sake. Japanese citizens are heavily insured:
all Japanese are covered by the national health insurance system,
and many carry elaborate life insurance policies in addition. Even
if they wanted more insurance, why buy insurance tailored narrowly
toward product-related accidents? Those Japanese consumers who
want the SG certification are therefore relatively less likely to be
consumers who need more insurance, than they are to be those who
prefer safer products. For them, the value of insurance lies in the
4
3 See 1994 EPA ANNOTATION, supra note 14, at 273-74.
4See 1993 EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 154.
45 See 1994 MITI EXPLANATION, supra note 10, at 189.
46 See HAYASHIDA, supra note 14, at 112.
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way it makes credible the manufacturer's assertions about safety.
Effectively, by facilitating claims against the manufacturer, the SG
system helps a firm "put its money where its mouth is." Effectively,
it helps the manufacturers of the safest products make their
promises about safety believable, and thereby gives them an
advantage in the product market." And precisely because the SG
system covers the safest products, it generates relatively few claims.
CONCLUSION
There is a moral here. It concerns the flexibility of firms, the
rationality of consumers, and the possibility of privately negotiated
law in unregulated markets. From time to time, proponents of strict
products liability assert that absent a mandatory regime manufactur-
ers will rarely compensate buyers for defective products. Stated so
baldly, the assertion is wrong on the facts: in many product
markets, some buyers want to purchase products carrying insurance
against personal injury, either for the insurance itself or for their
safety. To attract them, some firms have an incentive to offer that
coverage-and in Japan many firms did.
One should be careful. TheJapanese experience does not show
that producers offered the "optimal" level of insurance, and I do
not know how one would measure that level anyway. The Japanese
experience does show that some producers voluntarily subjected
themselves to a strict products liability regime. Consumers who
wanted products liability protection (or the safest products) bought
from those producers; consumers who preferred to take greater
risks and pay less for the product presumably bought from the
others.
"' For insightful discussions of the informational content of warranties (but
making slightly different points), see Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & EcON. 491, 509-13 (1981) (discussing warranties,
consumer information, and enforcement costs); Priest, supra note 33, at 1303
(discussing the signal theory of warranties which "maintains that warranty terms
provide information to consumers about the mechanical reliability of the product");
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (1983)
(explaining that firms react to consumers' lack of knowledge about market
opportunities by supplying appropriate warranty terms).
Furthermore, one suspects-the SG system itself provides no data on point-that
the SG firms, like the more reputable American firms, handle the most serious
product defects outside of the official claim procedures through straightforward
product recalls.
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Traditionally, we have compared two worlds: a world where
courts hold all producers to strict liability, and a world where
producers escape with a laxer standard. The Japanese experience
suggests our debate has been unreal. The true alternatives are
instead a world where courts hold all sellers to a strict products
liability regime and a world where consumers can choose-a world
where they choose between producers of low-priced goods who are
subject to a lax standard and producers of higher-priced goods who
voluntarily agree to subject themselves to strict liability.
48
Whatever the reason and whatever the wisdom, Japan now
mandates strict products liability for all goods. Readers nursing
beers in Tokyo sushi bars can take comfort in their newfound
security: the new beer bottles sport a label that would make the
American Trial Lawyers Association proud. Do not apply too much
pressure to the bottle, the label warns. It might break. And broken
bottles, it proceeds to warn beer drinkers, can cause injury.
4' I do not address the relative merits of "opt-in" systems (like the SG system) and
"opt-out" systems (traditionally allowed on a limited scale, for example, with respect
to some disclaimers under the UCC).
